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1 Introduction
Many economists view technology and trade as two of the paramount forces shaping labour mar-
kets in the United States and other advanced countries. New technologies augment human and
physical capital (Autor and Acemoglu, 2010) and enable firms to automate routine tasks previously
performed by middle-rank workers (Autor and Dorn, 2013), both of which contribute to a rise in
the relative demand for more-skilled labour (Katz and Autor, 1999). For its part, trade with low-
wage countries depresses wages and employment in the industries (Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren,
2010), occupations (Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips, forthcoming), and regions (Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson, 2013a) that are exposed to import competition.
While literature on the labour market consequences of technology and trade is extensive,1 exist-
ing work has not established the degree to which these two forces represent distinct shocks or, rather,
are varied facets of a common phenomenon. There is an obvious temporal link between them, as
rapid technical progress (e.g., the computer revolution) and growth in emerging economies (e.g., the
rise of China) are roughly contemporaneous events. Have technology and trade had quantitatively
similar impacts on overall employment and are the timing of these impacts in fact coincident? The
root of interest in these issues is in large part to explain growing income inequality and increas-
ing employment polarisation in the United States and other high income countries.2 How do the
magnitudes of employment changes in response to technology and trade shocks compare for workers
separated by age, education, sex, and occupational skill level? Differences in adjustment to shocks
of varied origin are likely to be evident at the sectoral level, with foreign competition affecting the
tradable manufacturing sector most acutely and technology shocks readily diffusing across sectors
regardless of their tradability. Are the sectoral employment impacts of automation broader than
those of globalisation or are there notable spillovers of trade shocks into non-manufacturing? When
it comes to addressing these questions, the literature gives only incomplete answers. We know that
technology and trade have been disruptive but we do not know the extent to which these disruptions
overlap and thus whether economic analysis must treat them conjointly.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the simultaneous impacts of technology and trade on U.S. em-
ployment levels and job composition, juxtaposing their effects across local labour markets, over time,
between sectors and occupations, and among workers of different education, age and sex categories.
Our analysis reveals a surprising degree of divergence between the labour market consequences of
1See Acemoglu and Autor (2010) and Harrison, McLaren and McMillan (2010) for discussions of the literature.
2See, e.g., Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schoenberg (2009), and Goos, Manning and
Salomons (2011).
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these two phenomena—both across industrial, occupational, geographic and demographic groups,
and over time as the trajectory of these forces has evolved.
The divergence that we document runs counter to perceptions that technology and trade play
mutually reinforcing roles in shaping labour-market developments in rich countries. Beyond their
obvious synchroneity, one association between the two appeals to their interdependence. As falling
trade costs permit firms to perform some production tasks offshore, the factors that remain at home
become more productive (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Reduced trade barriers may thus
cause simultaneous growth in productivity and trade.3 A second strand of reasoning that links
technology and trade recognises that many of the job tasks that are suitable for automation are
also suitable for offshoring (Blinder, 2009).4 Looking forward, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that some of the low-skill work that cannot presently be automated in rich countries could soon be
headed for the developing world.
Critical inputs into our analysis are measures of local labour market exposure to technological
change and to competition from international trade. As in our previous work, we focus on changes in
employment structure within 722 Commuting Zones (CZs) that approximate local labour markets
and that cover the entire continental United States. On the technology front, we follow Autor
and Dorn (2013, Autor-Dorn hereafter) who use Census data on industry and occupation mix by
CZ and data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles on job tasks by occupation to measure
the degree to which CZs were historically specialised in routine, codifiable job activities that are
well-suited to computerisation. As documented by Autor-Dorn, variation in industry specialisation
across CZs observed in 1950 can account for the differential pace at which these markets reacted to
the precipitous decline in the price of computing power after 1980 by adopting workplace computing
and reducing employment in routine task-intensive occupations.
On the trade front, we follow Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a, Autor-Dorn-Hanson hereafter)
in identifying trade shocks using cross-industry and cross-CZ variation in import competition stem-
ming from China’s rapidly rising productivity and falling barriers to trade. These forces have
catapulted China’s U.S. import presence—the share of Chinese imports in total U.S. expenditure
3Offshoring links trade and technology in another manner, as well. When firms relocate production stages within
an industry abroad, the average factor intensity of the stages that remain at home changes (Feenstra and Hanson,
1999). Standard measures of TFP do not account for shifts in the composition of activities performed inside industries,
such that trade-induced changes in the composition of production may be confounded with TFP growth.
4The reasoning here is that routine tasks that follow explicit codifiable procedures (as in Autor, Levy and Murnane,
2003) are well suited to automation because they can be computerised, and well suited to offshoring because they can
be performed at a distance without substantial loss of quality. However, there are many tasks that are offshorable but
not routine (for example, interpreting medical x-rays) and other tasks that are codifiable but not clearly offshorable
(e.g., adding vast arrays of numbers for actuarial analysis, or, to borrow an example from popular culture, the job
that Homer Simpson performs as Nuclear Safety Inspector at the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant).
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on goods—from less than 0.2 percentage points in 1987 points to 4.8 percentage points in 2007. To
isolate the components of this rise that are driven by shifts in China’s competitive position rather
than changes in U.S. product demand, we exploit the contemporaneous growth of Chinese exports by
industry to other high-income countries. This identification strategy posits that growth in Chinese
imports within a given industry (e.g., apparel, footwear, furniture, luggage, toys) that occurs simul-
taneously in the U.S. and other high-income countries is primarily driven by the surge in Chinese
productivity that has accompanied its transition to a market economy (Brand, Van Biesebroeck, and
Zhang, 2012; Hsieh and Ossa, 2012) and by reduced trade barriers resulting from China joining the
World Trade Organisation (Pierce and Schott, 2012). We then project these industry-level import
shocks to the level of local labour markets by interacting them with variation in CZ industry mix in
1980, prior to the rise of China. Since manufacturers within an industry tend to cluster geograph-
ically, China’s rising penetration of specific industries results in sharp disparities in the change in
import exposure across local labour markets.5
While strong spatial variation in industry specialisation leaves commuting zones differentially ex-
posed to changes in trade and technology, designating CZs as local labour markets only makes sense
if labour is not highly mobile across these zones. Otherwise, commuting zone-specifc labour mar-
ket shocks may fully diffuse across space. Consistent with partial labour mobility, Autor-Dorn and
Autor-Dorn-Hanson find evidence of sizable impacts of adverse economic events on CZ employment
but not on the size of CZ working-age populations, suggesting that much labour market adjustment
happens within commuting zones. These findings add to mounting evidence that the movement
of labour across U.S. cities and states in the aftermath of changes in regional labour demand is
slow and incomplete (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). It is this incom-
pleteness that renders commuting zones an appropriate spatial unit of analysis. Further relevant for
our work, incomplete adjustment to labour-market shocks appears to be most evident among less
educated workers, who comprise a large share of employment in the trade and technology-exposed
manufacturing sector (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Malamud and Wozniak, 2012).
Using data on CZs from 1980 to 2007, we assess the effects of exposure to import competition and
initial specialisation in routine tasks on overall employment, unemployment, and non-participation,
on job polarisation in manufacturing and non-manufacturing, and on the time path of adjustment
overall and by sector. The analysis produces three new sets of results on the causal effects of
5As a case in point, the CZ containing Providence, Rhode Island—a traditional manufacturing hub—saw estimated
increases in Chinese import exposure (that is, competing Chinese manufactures that would potentially be produced
in Providence if not imported) of $2, 330 per worker between 1991 and 2000, and an additional $3, 490 per worker
between 2000 and 2007. In contrast, the CZ containing New Orleans, Louisiana–which lacks industries that compete
directly with China—saw comparatively small increases of $170 and $490 per worker during these same intervals.
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advancing automation and rising low-wage country imports on local labour-market outcomes.
First, technology and trade have distinct effects on labour market aggregates. Whereas import
competition leads to sharp declines in local manufacturing employment and corresponding growth
in local unemployment and non-employment, exposure to routine task specialisation has largely
neutral overall employment effects. Workers with less than a college education are those most
affected by trade but show only small employment declines from technological change. Negative gross
manufacturing employment effects were evident in Autor-Dorn-Hanson with regards to increased
import competition, but were not examined in Autor-Dorn with regard to technical change. Our
contribution here is to place the overall manufacturing employment consequences from technology
and from trade side by side, which reveals the larger aggregate employment effects of globalisation
when compared to routinisation.
Second, technology and trade affect employment in broad occupational categories and sectors in
quantitatively different magnitudes and in qualitatively different directions. CZs more specialised in
routine occupations have employment losses in routine task-intensive occupations, but these losses
are largely offset by local employment growth in abstract and manual-task-intensive occupations,
thus leading to the pattern of occupational polarisation that has been the focus of Autor-Dorn.
A novel result is that this polarisation emerges both in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors, primarily due to the loss of routine production jobs in manufacturing and routine clerical jobs
in non-manufacturing. We contrast these patterns with new results on the impact of trade exposure
on occupational composition: While trade-exposed CZs also experience large employment declines
in routine task-intensive occupations in manufacturing, these CZs suffer further employment losses,
rather than gains, in manual and particularly in abstract task-oriented jobs, which together yield
the strongly negative overall employment effect of greater import competition. The novel results of
this paper for aggregate occupation-sector cells highlight a critical difference between the impacts
of technology and trade shocks: While technology affects the labour market at the occupation level
by shifting occupational composition within sectors, trade competition has a broad sectoral impact
and depresses employment across all occupation groups in manufacturing, with a notable negative
employment effect for higher-skilled managerial, professional, and technical jobs.
Third, and perhaps most strikingly, the timing of the sectoral impacts of technology and from
trade strongly diverge. With the rapid growth of U.S. imports from China, the effect of trade com-
petition on manufacturing has increased over time. Conversely, the effect of technological change on
employment composition inside of manufacturing has decelerated, with the largest impacts detected
in the 1980s and the smallest impacts found in the 2000s. Outside of manufacturing, however, the
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impact of automation accelerates during the three decades of our sample, suggesting that comput-
erisation of information processing in knowledge-intensive industries continues to intensify. Neither
Autor-Dorn nor Autor-Dorn-Hanson considered temporal variation in the magnitude of sectoral and
occupational labour market shocks. Our new results bring to light two under-appreciated features
of the U.S. labour market. The impacts of technology and trade appear to have little overlap either
across space or across time, which substantially simplifies the task of identifying their independent
contributions to changes in labour market outcomes.6 Further, routinisation affects sectors asyn-
chronously, meaning that its gross local labour market consequences will vary by decade depending
on regions’ initial patterns of industrial specialisation.
Our paper builds on two broad and active literatures. The first explores the impact of technical
change and trade on skill demands7 while the second studies how these forces shape labour-market
outcomes at the sub-national (i.e., local labour market) level.8 This paper contributes to these bodies
of work along two dimensions. First, our empirical approach exploits robust measures of exposure
to technology and trade and considers their distinct impacts. This is in contrast to existing research
that tends to focus on either technology or trade as candidate explanatory variables but rarely places
the two on equivalent empirical footing.9
An additional contribution of the paper is to examine a rich set of adjustment margins that
help to compare and contrast the magnitude, scope, and timing of technology and trade shocks.
Existing studies tend to focus on a just a few of these margins at a time, which creates an incomplete
panorama of labour market adjustment. The margins we examine include employment to population,
unemployment and non-participation, as well as shifts in employment across occupational categories
that differ in their intensity of abstract, routine and manual task input. Further, we consider these
outcomes separately by demographic groups comprised by gender, education and age, and sector.
It is by disaggregating technology and trade impacts by sector and occupation that we uncover
the differential timing of these shocks. In combination, we believe these analyses provide valuable
evidence on how the distinctive impacts of trade and technology on rich country (or, more specifically,
U.S.) labour markets can be characterised and interpreted.
6The negligible geographic correlation between trade and technology shocks is documented by Autor, Dorn and
Hanson (2013b). The differing temporal roles played by these shocks is a key finding of this paper.
7See, e.g., Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997), Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010), Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2012),
and other literature cited in Autor and Dorn (2013).
8See, e.g., Borjas and Ramey (1995), Michaels (2008), McLaren and Hakobyan (2010), Kovak (2013), Topalova
(2010), and other literature cited Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a).
9A number of papers consider the roles of both computerisation and potential offshoring simultaneously (e.g., Autor
and Dorn, 2013; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2012; Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2012; Oldenski, 2012; Michaels,
Natraj and Van Reenen, forthcoming). We are not aware of any comparable effort to simultaneously consider the
effects of computerisation and competition from international trade in goods on local labour market outcomes.
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2 Measurement
2.1 Local labour markets
Our analysis requires a time-consistent definition of regional economies in the U.S. We approximate
local labour markets using the construct of Commuting Zones developed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996),
who analyzed county-level commuting data from the 1990 Census data to create 741 clusters of
counties that are characterised by strong commuting ties within CZs, and weak commuting ties across
CZs. Our analysis includes the 722 CZs that cover the mainland United States (both metropolitan
and rural areas). Commuting zones are particularly apt for our analysis of local labour markets
because they cover both urban and rural areas, are based primarily on economic geography rather
than incidental factors such as minimum population, and can be consistently constructed using
Census Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs) for the full period we examine.10
2.2 Exposure to computerisation
Following an extensive literature, we conceive of recent automation as taking the form of a decline in
the cost of computerizing routine tasks, such as bookkeeping, clerical work, and repetitive production
and monitoring activities, thereby potentially displacing the workers performing these tasks.
To measure the degree to which CZs were historically specialised in routine, codifiable job ac-
tivities that were intrinsically well-suited to computerisation, we proceed in two steps. Using data
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (1977), we create a summary measure of the routine
task-intensity RTI of each occupation, calculated as:
RTIk = ln
(
TRk,1980
)− ln (TMk,1980)− ln (TAk,1980) , (1)
where TRk , T
M
k and T
A
k are, respectively, the routine, manual and abstract task inputs in each
occupation k in 1980.11 This measure is rising in the importance of routine tasks in each occupation
and declining in the importance of manual and abstract tasks.
To measure cross-market variation in employment in routine-intensive occupations, we apply
a simple binary approach to distinguish ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ occupations. We classify as
routine occupations those that fall in the top-third of the employment-weighted distribution of the
10Our analysis draws on Public Use Microdata from Ruggles et al. (2004). If a PUMA overlaps with several
counties, our procedure is to match PUMAs to counties assuming that all residents of a PUMA have equal probability
of living in a given county. The aggregation of counties to CZs then allows computing probabilities that a resident of
a given PUMA falls into a specific CZ.
11Tasks are measured on a zero to ten scale. For the five percent of microdata observations with the lowest manual
task score, we use the manual score of the 5th percentile. A corresponding adjustment is made for abstract scores.
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RTI measure in 1980. We then assign to each Commuting Zone j a routine employment share
measure (RSHjt) equal to the fraction of CZ employment at the start of a decade that falls in
routine task-intensive occupations:
RSHjt =
(∑K
k=1Ljkt · 1
[
RTIk > RTI
P66
]) (∑K
k=1Ljkt
)−1
. (2)
Here, Ljkt is the employment in occupation k in CZ j at time t, and 1 [·] is the indicator function,
which takes the value of one if the occupation is routine-intensive by our definition. By construction,
the mean of this measure is 0.33 in 1980, and the population weighted 75/25 percentile range is 6
percentage points.
To isolate the long-run, quasi-fixed component of the routine occupation share that is determined
prior to the onset of the era of rapid computerisation, we exploit historical cross-CZ differences in
industry specialisation as instruments for the observed level in each decade. Our instrumental
variables approach is as follows: let Eij,1950 equal the employment share of industry i ∈ 1, ..., I in
CZ j in 1950, and let Ri,−j,1950 equal the routine occupation share among workers in industry i in
1950 in all U.S. states except the state that includes CZ j.12 The product of these two measures
provides a predicted value for the routine employment share in each CZ, which depends only on the
local industry mix in 1950 and the occupational structure of industries nationally in 1950:
R˜SHj =
I∑
i=1
Ei,j,1950 ×Ri,−j,1950. (3)
Because the instrument is determined three decades prior to the onset of rapid computerisation in
the 1980s, we expect it to be correlated with the long-run component of the routine occupation share
but uncorrelated with contemporaneous innovations to this share.13
2.3 Exposure to international trade
Following Autor-Dorn-Hanson, we examine changes in exposure to international trade for U.S. CZs
associated with the growth in U.S. imports from China. The focus on China is a natural one:
rising trade with China is responsible for much of the expansion in U.S. imports from low-income
countries since the early 1990s. China’s export surge is a consequence of its transition to a market-
12We exclude own state employment from the construction of our instrument for local labour market conditions to
remove any mechanical correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable. Throughout the analysis,
we implicitly consider CZs to be part of the state that contains the largest share of their population.
13Appendix Table 3 of Autor and Dorn (2013) presents first-stage estimates for this instrumental variables model.
The predictive relationship between R˜SH and RSH is sizable and highly significant, with t-ratios of six or above
in each decade. The first-stage coefficient is close to unity in 1950, and takes smaller values in successive periods,
obtaining a coefficient of 0.27 in 2000. The decrease in magnitude is to be expected since initial conditions become
less determinative over time.
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oriented economy, which has involved rural-to-urban migration of over 150 million workers, Chinese
industries gaining access to long banned foreign technologies, capital goods, and intermediate inputs
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009), and multinational enterprises being permitted to operate in the country
(Naughton, 2007).14 Compounding the positive effects of internal reforms on China’s trade is the
country’s accession to the WTO, which gives it most-favored nation status among the 157 WTO
members (Pierce and Schott, 2012).
How can examining trade exposure in Commuting Zones be justified in terms of trade the-
ory? Because trade shocks play out in general equilibrium, one needs empirically to map many
industry-specific shocks into a small number of aggregate outcomes. For national labour markets
at annual frequencies, one is left with few observations and many confounding factors. By taking
regional economies as the unit of analysis, we circumvent the degrees-of-freedom problem endemic
to estimating the labour-market consequences of trade. This approach is valid for identifying the
labour-market consequences of trade insofar as (i) CZs differ in their pattern of industry special-
isation (due, e.g., to initial differences in comparative advantage at the regional level), and (ii)
frictions in labour markets allow regional differences in wages, unemployment, and labour-force non-
participation to persist over the medium run. Autor-Dorn-Hanson find strong evidence that greater
exposure to trade with China affects local labour market outcomes across CZs.
Following the empirical specification derived by Autor-Dorn-Hanson, our main measure of local
labour market exposure to import competition is the change in Chinese import exposure per worker
in a region, where imports are apportioned to each region according to its share of national industry
employment:
∆IPW china−usjt =
∑
j
Lijt
Luit
∆M china−usit
Ljt
. (4)
In this expression, ∆M china−usit is the observed change in U.S. imports from China in industry i
between the start and end of period t, Ljt is total start of period employment in region j , and
Lijt/Luit is region j’ s share in national employment of industry i.
In equation (4), the difference in ∆IPW china−usjt across local labour markets stems entirely
14While China overwhelmingly dominates low-income country exports to the U.S., trade with middle-income nations,
such as Mexico, may also matter for U.S. labour-market outcomes. The North American Free Trade Agreement (1994),
for instance, lowered U.S. barriers to imports to a country in which U.S. firms already had extensive supply networks.
Finding exogenous sources of variation in Mexico’s export growth, however, is tricky. Whereas China has had dramatic
productivity growth in manufacturing—making internal supply shocks an important source of its export growth—
Mexico has not (Hsieh and Klenow, 2012). The expansion of U.S. trade with Mexico is thus primarily driven by
changes in U.S. bilateral trade policy which could be influenced by economic conditions in U.S. industries. Arguably,
such simultaneity concerns are less an issue with regards to U.S. trade with China because of China’s phenomenal
productivity surge, which has been due in large part to how far inside the global technology frontier the country
remained at the end of the Maoist era. See McLaren and Hakobyan (2010) on the effects of NAFTA on U.S. local
labour markets.
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from variation in local industry employment structure at the start of period t. This variation
arises from two sources: differential concentration of employment in manufacturing versus non-
manufacturing activities and specialisation in import-intensive industries within local manufacturing.
Differences in manufacturing employment shares are not the primary source of variation, however:
in a bivariate regression, the start-of-period manufacturing employment share explains less than
25% of the variation in ∆IPW china−usjt . In our main specifications, we control for the start-of-period
manufacturing share within CZs so as to focus on variation in exposure to Chinese imports stemming
from differences in industry mix within local manufacturing sectors.
A concern for our subsequent estimation is that realised U.S. imports from China in (4) may
be correlated with industry import demand shocks. In this case, OLS estimates of the relationship
between increased imports from China and changes in U.S. manufacturing employment may un-
derstate the true impact, as both U.S. employment and imports may be positively correlated with
unobserved shocks to U.S. product demand. To identify the causal effect of rising Chinese import
exposure on U.S. manufacturing employment and other local labour-market outcomes, we employ an
instrumental variables strategy that accounts for the potential endogeneity of U.S. trade exposure.
We exploit the fact that during our sample period, much of the growth in Chinese imports stems
from the rising competitiveness of Chinese manufacturers (a supply shock from the U.S. producer
perspective) and China’s lowering of trade barriers, dismantling of the constraints associated with
central planning, and accession to the WTO. This approach requires that import demand shocks in
high-income countries are not the primary cause of China’s export surge.
To identify the supply-driven component of Chinese imports, we instrument for growth in Chinese
imports to the U.S. using the contemporaneous composition and growth of Chinese imports in eight
other developed countries.15 Specifically, we instrument the measured import exposure variable
∆IPW china−usjt with a non-U.S. exposure variable ∆IPW
china−other
jt that is constructed using data
on contemporaneous industry-level growth of Chinese exports to other high-income markets:
∆IPW china−otherjt =
∑
j
Lijt−1
Luit−1
· ∆M
china−other
it
Ljt−1
. (5)
This expression for non-U.S. exposure to Chinese imports differs from the expression in equation (4)
in two respects. First, in place of realised U.S. imports by industry (∆M china−usjt ), it uses realised
imports from China to other high-income markets (∆M china−otherjt ). Second, in place of start-of-
15The eight other high-income countries are those that have comparable trade data covering the full sample period:
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Our identification strategy is
related to that used by Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2009), who consider the relationship between imports from
China and innovation in Europe.
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period employment levels by industry and region, this expression uses employment levels from the
prior decade. We use 10-year-lagged employment levels because, to the degree that contemporaneous
employment by region is affected by anticipated China trade, the use of lagged employment to
apportion predicted Chinese imports to regions will mitigate this simultaneity bias.16
Our instrumental variable strategy requires that the common component of import growth in the
U.S. and in other high income countries derives from factors specific to China, associated with its
rapidly evolving productivity and trade costs. Any correlation in product demand shocks across high
income countries would represent a threat to our strategy, possibly contaminating both our OLS
and IV estimates.17 To check robustness against correlated demand shocks, Autor-Dorn-Hanson
develop an alternative estimation strategy based on the gravity model of trade, which utilises the
inferred change in China’s comparative advantage and market access relative to the United States. To
implement the strategy, they regress China exports relative to U.S. exports to a common destination
market on fixed effects for each importing country and for each industry. The time difference in
residuals from this regression captures the percentage growth in imports from China due to changes
in China’s productivity and foreign trade costs vis-a-vis the United States. By using China-U.S.
relative exports, the gravity approach differences out import demand conditions in the purchasing
country, thus isolating supply and trade-cost-driven changes in China’s exports.
The gravity-based approach helpfully addresses a second threat to identification, as well. It allows
for the possibility that U.S. – rather than Chinese – productivity shocks may be driving growth in
imports from China. Suppose, for example, that low productivity growth in the U.S. textile industry
induced shipments of its textile products to fall both in the domestic U.S. and in foreign European
markets. Each market may then import more from China, with this across-venue increase in Chinese
imports being driven by changes in U.S. supply. Because the gravity-model residuals summarise the
change in China’s comparative advantage relative to the United States, the measure effectively
subsumes changes in U.S. productivity. The gravity approach thus broadens the interpretation of
the estimated coefficient from capturing the impact of supply shocks in China to capturing the
impact of China-U.S. relative supply shocks. Despite this change in interpretation, China’s much
16A subtle point regarding our instrumentation strategy is that there is a larger time gap between the employment
values used to construct the instrument and those used to construct the regressor with regards to routinisation
(instrument data going back to 1950) than with regards to trade exposure (1980). We view it as unlikely that this
difference in time gap can account for the larger impacts that we estimate for trade exposure on employment levels than
for routinisation on employment levels. As we report below, for the routinisation variable OLS and 2SLS coefficient
estimates end up being very similar. Thus, narrowing the time gap between the instrument and the regressor for
routinisation to bring it more in line with the time gap for trade exposure would be unlikely to change the results –
our instrument already captures much of the conditional variation in routinisation.
17Positive correlation in product demand shocks across high income countries would make the impact of trade
exposure on labour-market outcomes appear smaller than it truly is.
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more rapid productivity growth makes it likely that its supply shocks, rather than those specific to
the U.S., are the primary drivers of the country’s export surge.18 Reassuringly, Autor-Dorn-Hanson
show that the gravity-based estimation strategy yields coefficient estimates quite similar to the IV
approach that we employ in this paper.
3 Results
We examine the local labour market consequences of exposure to routine task specialisation and
import competition from China in three stages, beginning with changes in labour market aggregates
(overall employment, unemployment, labour force participation), then considering differences in
employment effects by demographic group (sex, education, age), occupation (abstract, routine, and
manual task-intensive jobs), and sector (manufacturing, non-manufacturing), and finally evaluating
how outcomes at the sector and occupation level vary by decade from the 1980s to the 2000s.
As prelude to the analysis, we note that the divergent employment impacts of technology and
trade on CZs discussed in the following subsections have a spatial analogue. Autor, Dorn, and Han-
son (2013b) document that there is weak overlap in the geographic exposure of CZs to trade and
technology shocks. The CZs with the highest employment shares in routine task-intensive occupa-
tions constitute a mixture of manufacturing-intensive locations (in particular, locations around the
Great Lakes and in the Southeast) and human-capital-intensive large cities, including New York,
Chicago, Dallas, and Los Angeles. Routine task intensity has dual sources: blue-collar production
occupations associated with capital-intensive manufacturing, represented in the first group of CZs;
and white-collar office, clerical and administrative-support occupations associated with banking,
insurance, finance and other information-intensive sectors, represented in the second group.
Trade-exposed CZs, by contrast, are the subset of manufacturing-intensive regions specialised
in labour-intensive manufacturing, such as furniture, toys, apparel, footwear and leather goods.
Because CZs with high routine-task intensity include a broad collection of manufacturing and service
centres whereas CZs with high trade exposure constitute a narrow set of specialised industry clusters,
the potential intersection of these two sets of regions is limited. Moreover, the geography of trade
exposure is relatively concentrated. A substantial fraction of the most trade-exposed CZs are located
in a handful of states, including Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, North
Carolina, and Indiana, whereas routine task-intensive CZs are more dispersed throughout the U.S.
18Brandt, van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) estimate that over 1998 to 2007, China had average annual TFP
growth in manufacturing of 8.0%, compared to Bureau Labour Statistics’ estimate (http://www.bls.gov/mfp/) of
3.9% for the United States.
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A simple population-weighted correlation between technology exposure in (2) and trade exposure in
(4) finds that there is almost no relationship between the two: the correlation is −0.02 for the 1990
to 2000 period and 0.01 for the 2000 to 2007 period.19 The sets of heavily trade-exposed CZs and
of heavily technology-exposed CZs are thus largely disjoint. This feature of the data facilitates the
identification of separate effects of trade and technology on local labour markets.
3.1 Comparing the impacts of trade and technology on employment, unemploy-
ment and non-participation
We now turn to the main estimates on the impacts of trade and technology on local labour markets.
We focus initially on employment, unemployment and labour-force participation using an estimating
equation of the form:
∆Yjkt = γt + β1∆IPW
china−us
jt + β2RSHjt +X
′
jtβ2 + δk + ejkt. (6)
Here, the dependent variable ∆Yjkt is the decadal change in the employment-to-population ratio,
unemployment-to-population ratio, or non-participation rate among working age adults ages 16 to
64 in CZ i in U.S. Census division k during decade t.20 The main variables of interest are the
contemporaneous change in import exposure per worker ∆IPWit and the start of decade routine
employment share RSHjt, both measured at the CZ level. Also included are time-period effects γt,
a vector of eight Census division indicators δk that allow for differential employment trends across
regions, and a vector of control variables Xjt measuring start-of-period demographics and labour-
market structure in each CZ. Most estimates stack two sets of first differences, 1990–2000 and 2000–
2007, though we later explore estimates separately by decade while adding results for technology
exposure in the 1980–1990, a period in which exposure to Chinese imports was small. All regressions
are weighted by CZ shares of national population, and standard errors are clustered by state to allow
for over-time and within-state error correlations. Following our strategy outlined above, equation
(6) is estimated using two-stage least squares, with the import exposure variable instrumented by
contemporaneous changes in Chinese imports to other non-U.S. high-income countries in (5) and
the routine-share measure instrumented by CZs’ historical industry structures in (3).21
19The unweighted correlations are 0.21 and 0.31 in 1990 and 2000 respectively. The difference between the weighted
and unweighted correlations almost surely reflects the fact that rural areas are typically neither manufacturing intensive
nor concentrated in information-intensive or production-intensive occupations, both of which have high routine task
content. Absenting weighting, these sparsely populated rural areas increase the correlation substantially.
20For the period 2000 through 2007, we rescale the dependent variable to represent a decadal change by multiplying
it by the factor 10/7.
21The F statistics of the first stages in Table 1 are 92.0 and 61.6 for the models in columns 1 and 2, and 84.3 and
60.0 for the model in column 3. All instruments are statistically significant at p>0.001.
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(1) (2) (3)
-0.05 -0.21
(0.22) (0.25)
-0.70 ** -0.83 **
(0.16) (0.22)
-0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07)
0.21 ** 0.19 **
(0.06) (0.05)
0.06 0.21
(0.17) (0.19)
0.49 ** 0.65 **
(0.15) (0.19)
Table 1. Effect of  Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Routine-
Biased Technological Change on Employment Status among Working Age 
Population, 1990-2007: 2SLS Estimates.
Dep Var: 10-Year Equiv. Changes in Share of  Working Age Population in 
Indicated Employment Status (in %pts)
A. Outcome: Share Employed
Share of  Emp in Routine 
Occs
B. Outcome: Share Unemployed
Share of  Emp in Routine 
Occs
C. Outcome: Share Not in Labor Force
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
Share of  Emp in Routine 
Occs
Notes: N=1444 (722 commuting zones x 2 time periods). All regressions control for the 
start of  period levels of  share of  employment in manufacturing, share of  population 
that is college educated, share of  population that is foreign born, employment rate 
among females, and Census division dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of  period commuting zone share of  
national population.  ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
The first panel of Table 1 presents estimates of the impact of technology and trade exposure on
the employment-to-population ratio. While Autor-Dorn documented substantially faster adoption
of computer technology in routine-intensive CZs, the novel results in column 1 do not detect a
robust relationship between technology exposure and changes in the employment-to-population rate.
The point estimate of −0.05 on the routine-share measure is statistically insignificant and small in
magnitude. It implies a reduction in the employment-to-population rate of two-tenths of a percentage
point per decade in the 75th percentile CZ relative to the 25th percentile CZ.22 Consider next the
impact of exposure to import competition, in column 2, which replicates regression results in Autor-
Dorn-Hanson. The highly significant coefficient of −0.70 on the import exposure variable in the
second row indicates that a $1, 000 rise in a CZ’s import exposure per worker (in 2007 dollars) over
a ten-year period reduces the CZ’s employment-to-population rate by seven-tenths of a percentage
22The cross-CZ interquartile range of the start-of-period routine share variable is 4.0 percentage points 1990 and
3.3 percentage points in 2000.
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point. This economically large impact is well within the range of variation seen in our sample.
Between 1990 and 2007, the cross-CZ interquartile range of the increase in imports per worker
averaged approximately $1, 100 per decade.23
Including both the technology and trade measures in the regression simultaneously has little
impact on the results (column 3). The point estimate on each measure rises in absolute magni-
tude (specifically, the routine-share measure increases from −0.05 to −0.21 and the trade measure
increases from −0.70 to −0.83) while statistical significance is unaffected. Notably, the fact that
both measures become slightly more negative when the other is included implies that the conditional
correlation between the (instrumented) technology and trade variables is negative—areas with high
trade exposure have somewhat lower exposure to routine-task displacement, and vice versa.
The next two panels of Table 1 present complementary estimates for changes in unemployment
and non-participation. As with the employment-to-population rate, both the unemployment and
non-participation variables are constructed by dividing the count of workers in the relevant status
(unemployed, not in the labour force) by CZ working-age population ages 16-64. A comparison of the
point estimates for these three margins of adjustment thus provides an implicit decomposition of the
disemployment effects of trade or technology into unemployment and non-participation components.
In the case of the routinisation variable, the estimates suggests that any adverse employment effect,
if present, accrues to non-participation rather than unemployment (all point estimates are, however,
statistically insignificant). Trade exposure, by contrast, significantly increases both unemployment
and non-participation, with the non-participation effect in panel C of column 1 accounting for three
quarters (0.65/0.83) of the trade-induced decline in employment in panel A of column 1.
To evaluate the importance of the instrumentation strategy for our results, appendix Table A1
reports OLS estimates for the regressions shown in column (3) of Table 1. For the routinisation
variable, OLS coefficients differ little from those in 2SLS specifications, being slightly more negative
in the employment regression (−0.17 in column (1) of Table A1 versus −0.21 in column (A3) of
Table 1), slightly less positive in the non-participation regression (0.14 in column (3) of Table A1
versus 0.21 in column (C3) of Table 1), and also effectively zero in the unemployment regression
(0.03 in column (2) of Table A1 versus −0.01 in column (B3) of Table 1). The similarity in OLS
and 2SLS routinisation impacts arises in part from strong persistence in local labor markets’ routine
23During the first decade of the sample, imports per worker rose by $1, 320 in the 75th percentile CZ and $623
in the 25th percentile CZ, yielding an interquartile range of approximately $700. Between 2000 and 2007, imports
per worker rose even more rapidly, with decadal-equivalent gains of $3, 114 at the 75th percentile, $1, 599 at the 25th
percentile, and an interquartile range of $1, 515. Averaging over both decades yields a mean interquartile range of
approximately $1, 100. Notably, there is no evidence of CZ-level mean reversion in import exposure across decades,
so the interquartile range of the exposure variable for the full period is near to the sum of the interquartile ranges for
the 1990s and 2000s.
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employment shares, such that the 1950 industry employment composition used to construct the
instrument in (3) captures much of the conditional variation in the routine share in (2). The OLS
estimates for the trade exposure measure in Table A1 have the same signs but smaller magnitudes
than the corresponding 2SLS estimates in Table 1: (−0.12 in column (1) of Table A1 versus−0.83
in column (A3) of Table 1), the unemployment regression (0.05 in column (2) of Table A1 versus
0.19 in column (B3) of Table 1), and the non-participation regression (0.07 in column (3) of Table
A1 versus 0.65 in column (C3) of Table 1). Larger magnitudes for 2SLS coefficients are consistent
with OLS regressions being contaminated by unobserved U.S. product demand shocks, which induce
positive covariation between industry employment and imports, thereby leading OLS estimates to
understate the true impact of trade exposure on employment outcomes.24
Our first main empirical result is thus that technology and trade do not have comparable impacts
on aggregate employment, unemployment and non-participation. Greater trade exposure results
in significant overall losses of employment in local labour markets whereas greater exposure to
routinisation does not. Before considering why these effects may differ, we first drill down on the
possible heterogeneity of impacts across demographic groups.
3.2 Differences in employment effects by demographic group
We explore estimates comparable to those above performed separately for three demographic break-
downs: males versus females; non-college versus college-educated adults; and younger (ages 16 to
39) versus older adults (ages 40 to 64).25 Table 2 presents estimates.
Focusing first on the routine share variable, we find that in contrast to the insignificant relation-
ship between routinisation and aggregate employment, unemployment and non-participation, CZs
that were initially specialised in routine-intensive occupations saw significant falls in the employment-
to-population rate of females, and the implied effect is economically meaningful. The point estimate
of −0.49 in column 2 of panel A implies that comparing a CZ at the 75th percentile and 25th per-
centile of exposure to task-replacing technical change, the more exposed CZ would see a relative
decline in the female employment-to-population rate of 1.8 percentage points per decade. The ef-
fects of exposure to routinisation also appear larger for older versus younger workers, though this
difference is less precisely estimated. Any negative effects of technology exposure on employment
are largely absorbed by a corresponding increase in non-participation, seen in panel C, rather than
24As discussed in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a), the instrument in (5) may further help correct for measurement
error in trade exposure that attenuates OLS estimates.
25We define non-college workers as those with a high school degree or lower educational attainment, and college
workers as those with at least one year of college education.
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by an increase in unemployment, seen in panel B.
Males Females Non-College College Age<40 Age>=40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.10 -0.49 * -0.34 -0.29 ~ -0.10 -0.42 ~
(0.33) (0.20) (0.32) (0.16) (0.27) (0.23)
-0.71 ** -0.93 ** -1.21 ** -0.53 ** -0.82 ** -0.89 **
(0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (0.14) (0.20) (0.24)
-0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
0.17 ** 0.20 ** 0.25 ** 0.08 * 0.22 ** 0.14 *
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
-0.05 0.46 ** 0.32 0.33 * 0.13 0.39 *
(0.27) (0.15) (0.24) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20)
0.54 * 0.73 ** 0.96 ** 0.44 ** 0.60 ** 0.75 **
(0.22) (0.18) (0.26) (0.13) (0.17) (0.22)
Table 2. Effect of  Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Routine-Biased Technological Change on 
Employment Status among Working Age Population, 1990-2007: 2SLS Estimates.
Dep Var: 10-Year Equiv. Changes in Share of  Working Age Population in Indicated Employment Status (in %pts)
Share of  Emp in Routine 
Occs
B. Outcome: Share Unemployed
A. Outcome: Share Employed
Outcomes Measured Among
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
Share of  Emp in Routine 
Occs
Share of  Emp in Routine 
Occs
Notes: N=1444 (722 commuting zones x 2 time periods). All regressions control for the start of  period levels of  share of  employment in 
manufacturing, share of  population that is college educated, share of  population that is foreign born, employment rate among females, and 
Census division dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of  period commuting 
zone share of  national population.  ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
C. Outcome: Share Not in Labor Force
Turning next to trade exposure, a striking but not altogether unsurprising result is that the
disemployment impact of trade shocks seen in panel A appears to be substantially more severe for
non-college workers in column 3 than for college workers in column 4. A $1, 000 increase in per-
worker import exposure is estimated to reduce the non-college employment rate by 1.21 percentage
points and the college employment rate by 0.53 percentage points. More surprising, perhaps, is
that the effects of trade shocks on employment are otherwise uniformly large and significant for
both males and females and for both younger and older workers. Moreover, for all groups, the
bulk of the reduction in employment to population is accounted for by reductions in labour-force
participation rather than increases in unemployment—though the non-participation effect is larger
for older relative to younger workers, as seen in the comparison between column 6 and column 5.
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Why do we not observe a stronger effect on the fraction of adults who are unemployed? One
potential reason is that our outcome variables are measured at low frequency (10 and 7 years,
respectively, for the first and second periods) and thus capture medium-run effects. If, as seems
likely, technology or trade-induced job displacement leads initially to unemployment followed in the
longer term with re-employment or labour-force exit, these dynamics will likely be less visible using
low-frequency outcome measures.
The estimates in Table 2 further underscore our first result that trade and technology are not
a unified, monolithic force acting on the local labour market. The negative employment impacts of
routinisation are concentrated among females and to some extent among older workers, with smaller
and inconsistently signed effects for other demographic groups. By contrast, trade shocks appear to
reduce employment among all groups of workers that we considered, with a disproportionately large
effect among non-college workers. Some of the results from our next two analyses for occupational
and sectoral impacts offer help to interpret these demographic patterns.
3.3 Effects of trade and technology on occupations and tasks
We have so far focused on employment status as our sole outcome measure. We now deepen this
analysis by asking how trade and technology shocks alter the distribution of job tasks that workers
supply, which we proxy using employment by occupation. The following analysis explores employ-
ment in three broad occupational categories that differ in their primary job task content. The first
category includes managerial, professional and technical occupations, which are relatively specialised
in abstract problem-solving and organisational tasks and employ comparatively highly educated and
highly paid workers. The second broad job category includes production, clerical and administrative
support, and sales occupations. These occupations are routine-task intensive and hence potentially
subject to increasing substitution of computer capital for labour. The third category encompasses
mechanics, craft and repair occupations, agricultural occupations and service occupations. These
occupations employ primarily non-college labour and are intensive in manual job tasks that demand
physical flexibility and adaptability, which have proven challenging to automate.26
26The analysis in Autor and Dorn (2013) offers summary information on task content by occupation that documents
the logic of this categorisation. See especially Table 2 of their paper.
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All Males Females Non-Clg College Age<40 Age>=40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.15 0.35 * -0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.32 * -0.11
(0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11)
-0.14 -0.05 -0.22 * -0.17 ** -0.16 -0.08 -0.24 *
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
-0.36 ** -0.32 ** -0.44 ** -0.37 * -0.32 ** -0.37 ** -0.43 **
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11)
-0.48 ** -0.37 ** -0.61 ** -0.63 ** -0.32 ** -0.46 ** -0.52 **
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
0.01 0.07 0.00 0.09 -0.06 ~ -0.05 0.12 ~
(0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
-0.22 ** -0.29 ** -0.11 -0.42 * -0.05 -0.29 ** -0.14 ~
(0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.21) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08)
B. Outcome: Share Employed in Production/Clerical/Retail Sales Occs
C. Outcome: Share Employed in Craft/Mechanics/Agricultural/Service Occs
Table 3. Effect of  Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Routine-Biased Technological Change on 
Employment by Occupation Group among Working Age Population, 1990-2007: 2SLS Estimates.
Dep Var: 10-Year Equiv. Changes in Share of  Working Age Population Employed in Indicated Occupation 
Group (in %pts)
A. Outcome: Share Employed in Managerial/Professional/Technical Occs
Share of  Emp in 
Routine Occs
Outcomes Measured Among
Primary Task: Abstract
(Δ Imports from China 
to US)/Worker
Notes: N=1444 (722 commuting zones x 2 time periods). All regressions control for the start of  period levels of  share of  
employment in manufacturing, share of  population that is college educated, share of  population that is foreign born, employment 
rate among females, and Census division dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are 
weighted by start of  period commuting zone share of  national population.  ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
Share of  Emp in 
Routine Occs
Primary Task: Routine
Primary Task: Manual
(Δ Imports from China 
to US)/Worker
(Δ Imports from China 
to US)/Worker
Share of  Emp in 
Routine Occs
To explore how technology and trade affect employment in these three task categories, we es-
timate a variant of equation (6) where the dependent variable is the change in the fraction of the
working-age population employed in each occupational group. Table 3 presents estimates.27 The
first column, which pools all demographic groups, finds substantial differences between the effects of
technology and trade on occupations. The estimated effect of routinisation on employment is nega-
tive, significant and large for only one occupational category: routine task-intensive occupations in
panel B. The point estimate of −0.36 implies a substantial 1.8 percentage point per decade differen-
tial decline in the share of working-age adults employed in this broad occupational category in the
27Note that non-employment (unemployment and non-participation) constitutes a fourth outcome category. The
impact of trade or technology on this category is simply the negative of its effect on employment in the three
occupational groups considered in Table 3 (see panel A of Table 2).
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75th percentile CZ relative to the 25th percentile CZ. The point estimates also suggest that employ-
ment in abstract and manual-task-intensive occupations experiences offsetting gains, though these
effects are not statistically significant. In combination, the pattern of results is consistent with the
well-known finding that computerisation is associated with occupational polarisation—that is, gains
in the share of employment in relatively high-education, abstract-task-intensive occupations and rel-
atively low-education, manual-task-intensive occupations relative to the employment in middle-skill,
routine task-intensive jobs.
By contrast, increases in trade exposure reduce overall employment in column 1 across all three
broad task categories, with the largest impact found in employment in routine task-intensive oc-
cupations in panel B (−0.48 percentage points for a $1, 000 rise in trade exposure), the second
largest effect in manual-task-intensive occupations in panel C (−0.22), and the smallest effect in
abstract-task-intensive occupations in panel A (−0.14, which is not significant).28
Together, these estimates offer two novel insights, which together constitute the second major
finding of our paper. First, exposure to technology and to trade have in common that their largest
negative effects are on the middle category of routine task-intensive occupations. And second, expo-
sure to trade and to technology differ in that trade has negative employment effects throughout the
task distribution whereas technology does not. The qualitatively distinct impacts of routinisation on
employment by occupation and the qualitatively similar occupational impacts of import competition
are responsible for the divergent effects of these two forces on overall employment—that is, neutral
gross technology impacts and strongly negative gross trade impacts.
To reveal possible heterogeneity in these occupational impacts according to worker character-
istics, we next examine how the varying exposure of occupational groups to technology and trade
shocks depends on workers’ sex, education, and age. Following the format of Table 2, columns 2 to
7 of Table 3 present estimates of the impacts of technology and trade on job tasks by demographic
subgroup: males and females, college and non-college adults, and younger and older adults. Across
all demographic groups, technology exposure significantly and quite uniformly reduces employment
in routine task-intensive occupations according to Panel B. While most estimates for the impact on
abstract and manual-task intensive occupations in Panels A and C are positive but insignificant,
these results can account for some of the heterogeneous employment effects documented in Table 2.
In particular, while losses in routine employment among men are offset by corresponding gains in
occupations with abstract tasks, such offsetting gains are absent for women, thus generating a nega-
tive overall impact of technology exposure on female employment. The results for different age and
28Note that these three coefficients sum to −0.84, which is identical (up to rounding) to the negative estimated
effect of trade on the employment to population rate in column 3 of Table 1.
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education groups also reveal differential patterns of labour reallocation following declines in routine
task-intensive jobs: Among young and among college-educated workers, all offsetting employment
gains occur in abstract task-intensive jobs, while any offsetting gain among older and less educated
workers is in the manual task-intensive jobs that include many low-wage occupations.
Trade shocks uniformly have the greatest (negative) impact on employment in routine task-
intensive occupations across all demographic groups in panel B, with the largest impacts found for
females in column 3 and non-college adults in column 4. Trade shocks also substantially reduce
employment in manual-task-intensive occupations in panel C among males (column 2), non-college
workers (column 4), and younger workers (column 6), and reduce employment in abstract-task-
intensive occupations in panel C among females (column 3), non-college adults (column 4) and older
adults (column 7).
These results shed light on our earlier finding that non-college adults suffer disproportionate
employment losses from trade shocks. While one might have speculated that this is because they
are concentrated in production occupations, the Table 3 results suggest otherwise. Though non-
college employment falls most in routine task-intensive occupations—which, logically, include many
production positions—it also drops significantly in manual and abstract-task-intensive occupations.
In fact, net employment losses in these two job categories are essentially equal to the loss in the
routine task-intensive categories. Thus, non-college adults in all occupation groups appear exposed
to greater importer competition from China.
The Table 3 findings are also helpful for reconciling alternative views of offshoring that have
emerged in the trade literature. Older approaches to offshoring (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1999)
emphasise variation in factor intensity across manufacturing stages to explain the fraction of produc-
tion moved offshore whereas newer approaches to offshoring (e.g., Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2008) focus on the inherent offshorability of tasks, abstracting away from factor intensity. Our re-
sults suggest there is a role for both channels: factor intensity matters (as shown by non-college
workers being the skill group most impacted by trade) but so does the nature of the task (as shown
by routine occupations being most affected by exposure to import competition).
3.4 Sectoral impacts
Our final set of empirical exercises considers the sectoral dimension of technology and trade shocks,
which leads naturally into an examination of their timing. We expect the effects of international
trade on the domestic labour market to be most concentrated in the manufacturing sector, where
competition from imports is most intense. Should we expect the same for technology? On the
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one hand, earlier literature finds substantial impacts of the adoption of computer capital on skilled
labour demand in manufacturing, and offers some evidence that this relationship started a decade
earlier in manufacturing than non-manufacturing (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1992; Autor, Katz
and Krueger, 1998). Conversely, computerisation is now ubiquitous in the workplace, and serves
as the backbone of most information-intensive activities. Thus, we might expect any employment
effects to be as large or larger outside of manufacturing.
We explore these relationships in Table 4, by estimating a variant of equation (6) for the effect
of technology and trade exposure on the share of working-age population employed in six sector-
occupation cells: manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors crossed with abstract, routine and
manual-task-intensive occupations. As in prior tables, our outcome variables are measured as ten-
year equivalent changes in the percentage of working-age population employed in each cell, with
non-employment constituting a residual category. Thus, the sum of the trade or technology effect on
the fraction of working-age adults employed in these six sector-occupation cells will equal its effect
on the employment to population ratio. One difference between these estimates and the earlier
specifications is that we construct separate CZ-level routine-share variables for the manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors.29 Further, within manufacturing we divide routine task-intensive
jobs into two groups, production occupations and clerical and sales occupations. The impacts
of automation in manufacturing production are likely to be concentrated on the former and our
subsequent analysis will confirm this intuition.
Beginning with the results for trade in the second row, we find that consistent with expec-
tations trade shocks have disproportionate effects on employment in manufacturing. In column
1 of panel I, a $1, 000 per worker increase in trade exposure reduces manufacturing employment
by 0.50 percentage points. While the negative impact of trade exposure on manufacturing em-
ployment is not surprising, the breakdown of this result by occupation groups provides a striking
insight: Only half of the trade-induced decline in manufacturing employment (0.240/0.504) accrues
to production occupations, while a similar reduction stems from reductions in ’white collar’ jobs in
managerial, professional, technical and clerical occupations (columns 2 and 3 of panel I), which like
manufacturing-production jobs employed about five percent of working-age adults in 1990. These
results suggest that adverse employment effects of Chinese trade competition have not been concen-
trated solely on U.S. production workers, but have affected the manufacturing sector more broadly,
with notable employment losses in both production and non-production activities.
29Introducing this additional degree of freedom is likely to be important because the cross-CZ correlation between
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing routine share variables is surprisingly low: 0.18 in 1990 and 0.13 in 2000
(weighted by CZ population).
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The effect of trade shocks is not limited to manufacturing. Consistent with the results in
Autor-Dorn-Hanson, we estimate a smaller but non-trivial contemporaneous reduction in non-
manufacturing employment. While the point estimate of −0.20 in column 1 of panel II is not
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statistically significant, this reflects countervailing effects across occupational categories within non-
manufacturing. Employment in manual-task-intensive occupations falls by a significant −0.18 per-
centage points in column 4 and in routine task-intensive occupations and by a marginally significant
−0.09 percentage points in column 3 while rising slightly by 0.06 percentage points in abstract-
task-intensive occupations in column 2. This pattern likely reflects local demand spillovers from
manufacturing to non-manufacturing. As manufacturing employment contracts, demand from both
businesses and consumers for locally produced services such as construction, entertainment, food
away from home, and retail trade is likely to fall. The consequence is reduced employment in vari-
ous routine-task and manual-task activities outside the sector, as shown in the last two columns of
the table.
Results for the impacts of exposure to technology are presented in the first row of Table 4. Lo-
cal labour markets with a routine task-intensive manufacturing sector experience a slight shift of
employment from routine to abstract and manual occupations, as seen by comparing column 4 to
columns 2 and 5 in panel I, though none of these effects nor the overall effect of employment in man-
ufacturing is statistically significant. By contrast, routinisation more clearly predicts employment
polarisation in non-manufacturing, with reduced employment in routine task-intensive occupations
in column 3 of panel II and offsetting gains in both abstract and manual-task-intensive occupations
in columns 2 and 4. While neither of the latter two point estimates is statistically significant, it is
noteworthy that the net effect of routinisation on employment in non-manufacturing appears to be
weakly positive.
Panel B of Table 4 illustrates the magnitudes of these effects by computing the interquartile
range of effect sizes for both the trade and technology measures averaged over the two decades of
our sample. These computations suggest that variation in trade exposure explains more of the decline
in routine production employment in the manufacturing sector than does variation in technology
exposure (column 4 of panel IB) while variation in technology exposure predicts a larger decline in
routine task-intensive employment outside manufacturing (column 3 of panel IIB). In both sectors,
technology exposure is associated with expansions in abstract and manual task-intensive occupations
that roughly offset employment losses in routine occupations.
Given dramatic advances in computer-aided manufacturing in recent decades as well as the
high levels of manufacturing investment in computer capital, it may seem surprising that we do
not find a stronger negative effect of technology exposure on production jobs in manufacturing, or
manufacturing employment overall. These results pose a puzzle, whose resolution helps draw a sharp
distinction between the temporal pattern of technology and trade shocks by sector and leads to the
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final main result in the paper: It may be that negative employment effects of technology were evident
in a period before our sample begins. To investigate this possibility, we extend the sample backward
by a decade to the 1980s. While we can measure technology exposure for the 1980s, a corresponding
analysis for exposure to Chinese trade competition it is not practical because large-scale trade with
China only commenced in the 1990s.30 Table 5 presents these results.
All Other All Other
Occs Occs
Primary Task Abstract Routine Routine Manual Abstract Routine Manual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
0.003 -0.036 ** -0.094 ** -0.019 0.258 ** -0.077 ** 0.068 **
(0.011) (0.010) (0.028) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020)
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
-0.024 -0.027 ** -0.068 * 0.021 ~ 0.065 -0.183 ** 0.108 **
(0.018) (0.010) (0.031) (0.012) (0.061) (0.041) (0.034)
-0.164 ~ -0.046 -0.095 0.016 -0.104 -0.206 * -0.295 ~
(0.086) (0.044) (0.115) (0.036) (0.134) (0.098) (0.155)
-0.026 -0.038 ** 0.017 0.026 ~ 0.100 -0.282 ** 0.057
(0.029) (0.014) (0.038) (0.015) (0.067) (0.057) (0.098)
-0.254 * -0.060 ** -0.129 ** 0.024 0.135 * -0.008 0.150 ~
(0.104) (0.018) (0.040) (0.019) (0.058) (0.087) (0.090)
B. 1990 - 2000
Table 5. Effect of  Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Routinization on Employment by Sector and Occupation 
Group, 1980-2007: 2SLS Estimates.
Dep Var: 10-Year Equiv. Changes in Share of  Working Age Population Employed in Sector-Occupation Cell (in %pts)
I. Manufacturing Sector II. Non-Manufacturing Sector
Mgmt/ 
Prof/ 
Tech
Cleric/ 
Retail 
Mgmt/ 
Prof/ 
Tech
Prodn/ 
Cleric/ 
Retail 
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
Notes: N=722 commuting zones. All regressions control for start of  period share of  employment in manufacturing and Census division dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are weighted by start of  period commuting zone share of  national population.  ~ p 
≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
Prodn
Share of  Sectorial Emp in 
Routine Occs
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
C. 2000 - 2007
Share of  Sectorial Emp in 
Routine Occs
A. 1980 - 1990
Share of  Sectorial Emp in 
Routine Occs
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
Consistent with our conjecture, we find strong evidence in panel I of the table that routinisation
led to significant employment polarisation in manufacturing in the 1980s, characterised by a strong
decline in routine occupation employment for production workers and little changes in abstract and
manual employment. The impact of the technology exposure measure on routine task-intensive
production employment in column 3 becomes weaker in each of the subsequent decades, seen by
comparing the coefficients for the 1980s in panel A (−0.094), to the 1990s in panel B (−0.068), and
30Furthermore, harmonised trade data, needed to match bilateral trade flows to U.S. industry codes, is only available
for the 1990s and later. Autor-Dorn-Hanson show that the local labour markets with differential exposure to China
after 1990 did not have differential trends in manufacturing employment in the 1980s.
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to the 2000s in panel C (0.017), by which point the impact is weakly positive. For routine task-
intensive manufacturing employment in clerical and sales occupations, the effect of routinisation is
negative, significant, and stable in magnitude across all three decades.31
Strikingly, the declining secular effect of routinisation on job polarisation in manufacturing is
matched by an accelerating impact of technology on routine-task employment in non-manufacturing.
The significant point estimate for the routine share of −0.8 for the decade of the 1980s (row 1 of
column 2 in panel II) more than doubles to −0.18 in the 1990s (row 3), and almost quadruples to
−0.28 by the 2000s (row 5). In net, these results suggest that the primary impact of technological
change on employment has shifted from automation of routine production tasks in manufacturing
to computerisation of routine information-processing tasks, which are concentrated in services.
These findings stand in sharp contrast to the direct impacts of trade exposure on employment.
The coefficient estimates in Table 5 indicate that negative effect of import competition in manu-
facturing increases slightly in absolute value from the 1990s to the 2000s for routine and abstract
task-intensive occupations (columns 1 to 3) and for abstract task-intensive occupations (column 2),
though not for manual task-intensive jobs (column 4). Compounding these changes, the magnitude
of the trade shock itself, as defined in (4), doubles between the first and second decades of our sam-
ple due to the very rapid rise in Chinese import penetration in the U.S. market following China’s
accession to the WTO in 2001.32 Thus, the negative impact of trade exposure on manufacturing
employment has intensified strongly over time.
Overall, the Table 5 estimates suggest that computerisation did have substantial impacts on job
task composition in manufacturing, but that this impact was felt with greatest force in the 1980s and
1990s, and had little further effect in the 2000s. This result encapsulates the third major finding of
our paper: Whereas the negative employment effects on manufacturing from import competition have
intensified over time, the corresponding effects from routinisation have weakened. By contrast, the
impact of technology exposure on routine task-intensive jobs outside of manufacturing has intensified,
suggesting that the labour market effect of technology is shifting from replacement of production
work to automation of information processing tasks in the service sector.
31The mean value of the routine share variable declines slowly over the sample period, from 39.1% to 35.7% in the
manufacturing sector, and from 30.8% to 26.0% in the non-manufacturing sector.
32The CZ average for the 10-year equivalent growth of employment per worker is $1,140 in the 1990s, and $2,627
in the 2000s.
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4 Conclusions
There is a wide agreement among economists that technological change and expanding international
trade have led to changing skill demands and growing inequality and rising polarisation of labour-
market outcomes in the U.S. and in other rich countries. While this paper confirms that both
forces have shaped employment patterns in U.S. local labour markets in the last three decades, its
main contribution is to highlight important differences in the impact of technology and trade on
labour markets. The effects of trade and technology can be observed separately because local labour
market exposure to technological change, as measured by specialisation in routine task-intensive
production and clerical occupations, is largely uncorrelated with local labour market exposure to
trade competition from China.
Local labour markets with greater exposure to trade competition experience differentially large
declines in manufacturing employment, with corresponding growth in unemployment and non-
employment. The employment decline is not limited to production jobs but instead affects all
major occupation groups, including a notable decline in managerial, professional and technical jobs.
Employment losses are particularly large among workers without college education, for whom we
also observe employment declines outside the manufacturing sector which may stem from local de-
mand spillovers. While trade exposure reduces overall employment and shifts the distribution of
employment between sectors, exposure to technological change has substantially different impacts,
characterised by neutral effects on overall employment but substantial shifts in occupational com-
position within sectors. In particular, we find that susceptibility to technological change predicts
declining employment in routine task-intensive production and clerical occupations both in the man-
ufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. For most demographic groups, these declines in routine
employment are largely offset by increasing employment in abstract or manual task-intensive occu-
pations which tend to comprise the highest and lowest paid jobs in the economy. One exception is
among women, for whom the reduction in routine-occupation employment translates to an overall
decline in employment.
Concurrent with the rapid growth of U.S. imports from China, the effect of trade competition
on the manufacturing sector has become stronger over time, while the effect of technological change
on employment composition in the manufacturing sector has subsided. Conversely, the impact of
technology on the non-manufacturing sector is growing as technological change seems to be shifting
from automation of production in manufacturing to computerisation of information processing in
knowledge-intensive industries.
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Employed Unem- Not in
ployed Labor Force
(1) (2) (3)
-0.17 ~ 0.03 0.14 ~
(0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
-0.12 0.05 * 0.07
(0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
       log:  C:\Users\David Dorn\Documents\Dropbox (CEMFI)\Current Projects\China-P&P-Untangling\do\../log/c
> s_tasks_v11.log
  log type:  text
 closed on:  19 Aug 2014, 13:06:49
Table A1. Effect of Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Routine-
Biased Technological Change on Employment Status among Working Age 
Population, 1990-2007: OLS Estimates.
Dep Var: 10-Year Equiv. Changes in Share of Working Age Population in 
Indicated Employment Status (in %pts)
Share of Working Age Population
Share of Emp in Routine 
Occs
(Δ Imports from China to 
US)/Worker
Notes: N=1444 (722 commuting zones x 2 time periods). All regressions control for the start 
of period levels of share of employment in manufacturing, share of population that is college 
educated, share of population that is foreign born, employment rate among females, and 
Census division dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. 
Models are weighted by start of period commuting zone share of national population.  ~ p ≤ 
0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.
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